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The effects of misses of an automated alarm and fault diagnosis system on different manifestations of 
automation misuse were examined. 24 participants operated a complex multi-task process control 
simulation. During training, they either experienced automation misses or were only informed that failures 
might occur. The experience of misses reduced complacency towards the alarm function of the decision aid 
as well as omission errors but did neither affect complacency towards the aid’s diagnostic function nor 
commission errors. Implications of this specific effect of automation misses for the design of training 
measures as well as the theoretical understanding of automation misuse are discussed. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Sophisticated automation is finding its way into more and 
more work environments as diverse as aviation, maritime 
operations, and process control. Although automation exhibits 
a great potential to extend human performance and improve 
safety, it also has given rise to new sources of error and risks. 
One of these risks is represented by an inappropriate, e.g. too 
high level of trust placed in the automation by the human 
operator (Lee & See, 2004). Such over trust can lead to 
automation misuse, i.e. an uncritical reliance on the proper 
function of an automated system without recognizing its 
limitations and the possibilities of automation failures 
(Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). One manifestation of this 
misuse emerges in an inappropriate monitoring or cross-
checking of automated functions, a phenomenon which 
commonly has been referred to as “automation induced 
complacency” or just “complacency” (Moray & Inagaki, 2000; 
Parasuraman, Molloy, & Singh, 1993). In several studies it 
was demonstrated that particularly high and consistent reliable 
systems give rise to complacency effects (e.g. Parasuraman et 
al. 1993; Prinzel, DeVries, Freeman, & Mikulka, 2001). 
Complacency-like effects have been suggested to emerge 
not only in classical monitoring settings but also in other fields 
of human-computer interaction, notably in the use of decision 
aids. Such aids usually serve several functions. One of these 
functions involves some kind of alert, i.e. making the user 
aware of the fact that some action is needed. Beyond that, 
other functions often involve recommendations of specific 
actions to take. An example of such an aid might include a 
diagnostic aid in supervisory control which, on the one hand, 
provides an alert in case of critical system states and, on the 
other hand, recommends a sequence of appropriate actions to 
respond to this state. According to these different functions, 
two kinds of error can arise which might be related to 
complacency effects. The first one involves so called 
“omission errors”, i.e. when operators rely so much on the 
alarm function of the aid that they do not monitor the system 
and fail to notice problems if the automated aid fails to alert 
them. The second one has been described as “commission 
error” which occurs when operators follow a recommendation 
of an automated aid even though this recommendation is 
wrong. Hence, complacency, in terms of an insufficient 
monitoring or cross-checking of the automation, might 
represent a possible cause for both commission as well as 
omission errors. Mosier and Skitka (1996) referred to these 
two kinds of error as automation bias. Empirical research 
revealed that complacency and automation bias represent 
persistent and difficult to avoid problems (e.g. Bailey & 
Scerbo, 2007; Mosier, Skitka, Dunbar, & McDonnel, 2001). 
However, one possible countermeasure against 
complacency and automation bias might consist in the 
experience of automation failures. Several studies 
demonstrated that even single automation failures can reduce 
trust in automation dramatically (e.g. Lee & Moray, 1992; 
Dzindolet, Peterson, Pomranky, Pierce, & Beck, 2003). Thus, 
over trust, and therewith the basis of both phenomena, should 
disappear by the experience of automation failures. Based on 
this rationale, Manzey, Bahner, and Hueper (2006) examined 
the effect of automation failures during training on 
complacency and commission errors in the use of a decision 
aid. This aid supported the operator by detecting, diagnosing, 
and managing occurring system faults. Automation failures 
during training consisted in false fault diagnoses provided by 
the aid. Results showed that this experience of false diagnoses 
during training reduced complacency compared to a control 
group, which was just informed, that automation failures might 
occur. Specifically, participants who experienced false 
diagnoses cross-checked the diagnoses provided by the 
decision aid in the subsequent test phase more thoroughly. 
However, exploratory data analyses revealed that the 
experience of false diagnoses did not increase cross-checking 
during “normal” system state, i.e. when the decision aid did 
not display any failure message. Even though the experience of 
diagnostic failures decreased the participants’ level of 
complacency towards the diagnostic function, it obviously did 
not affect their level of complacency towards the alarm 
function of the decision aid. This implies that the participants 
perceived the two functions of the system as qualitatively 
different. Although this exploratory result does not allow for a 
clear-cut interpretation, it clearly contrasts the finding of Muir 
and Moray (1996) that distrust spreads between separate 
system functions. Yet, the result obviously bears analogy to the 
theoretical distinction between reliance and compliance in the 
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context of binary warning systems. While compliance refers to 
the response when an operator acts according to a warning 
signal, reliance represents the response when the warning 
system indicates that the system is intact and the user 
accordingly does not take precautions (Meyer, 2004). Several 
studies suggest that compliance and reliance are affected 
differently by automation failures, i.e. misses and false alarms 
of a warning system. Yet, it is still a matter of debate whether 
reliance and compliance are independent from one another 
(Dixon, Wickens, & McCarley, 2007; Meyer, 2001). However, 
whether such a differential effect of failure types found in the 
use of binary warning systems also holds for more complex 
decision aids, remains unclear. A clarification of this issue 
would be important with regard to operator training. More 
specifically, it would suggest that users might develop 
different levels of trust with regard to different automated 
functions although all of them are served by the same device. 
As a consequence, users would need to be familiarized with 
automation failures of all main automation functions during 
training in order to reduce automation misuse effects 
comprehensively.   
The present study shall contribute to further elaborate the 
relationship between complacency, commission errors, and 
omission errors in interaction with decision aids. Using a 
similar experimental paradigm as Manzey et al. (2006) it is 
investigated to what extent experiences of automation failures 
during training affect the user’s behavior with respect to 
different automated functions. Complementary to the study of 
Manzey et al. (2006), it is addressed how the experience of 
failures of the aid’s alarm function (“automation misses”) 
during training affects misuse towards the different aid’s 
functions, i.e. its alarm function and diagnostic function, in the 
subsequent test phase. Two different experimental groups were 
compared. One group just got the general information that 
automation failures might occur but worked with a completely 
reliable aid during training. The other group got the same 
information. However, during training participants of this 
group were additionally exposed to sudden automation 
failures. These failures involved “automation misses”, i.e. 
events in which the aid failed to alert the user in case of a 
critical system state. Assuming the existence of a specific 
failure effect on automation misuse, the following hypotheses 
can be derived: (1) Compared to the sole information that 
failures might occur, the experience of automation misses 
during training decreases complacency towards the alarm 
function of the decision aid and (2) reduces the number of 
omission errors in case of occurring automation misses. (3) 
The participants’ degree of complacency towards the aid’s 
diagnostic function remains unaffected by the experimental 
manipulation as does (4) the number of commission errors in 
case of a suggested false diagnosis. 
 
METHOD 
 
Participants 
 
A total of 24 engineering students (4 female, 20 male) 
participated in the experiment. One male participant did not 
obey the instructions regarding the preassigned procedure of 
fault detection and had to be excluded from the experiment. 
The age of the remaining participants ranged from 21 to 29 
years (M = 24.33, SD = 1.85). They were paid € 40 each for 
completing the study. None of the participants had any prior 
experience with the AutoCAMS task environment used in the 
study. 
 
Apparatus: AutoCAMS Task Environment 
 
The experiment was conducted by using a modified 
version of the PC-based simulation of a process control task 
AutoCAMS (Hockey, Wastell, & Sauer, 1998; Lorenz, Di 
Nocera, Roettger, & Parasuraman, 2002). This simulation is 
based on the Cabin Air Management System (CAMS) task 
originally developed by Hockey et al. in order to investigate 
the effects of stress on complex human performance. 
AutoCAMS simulates an autonomously running life 
support system of a spacecraft consisting of five subsystems 
that are critical to maintain atmospheric conditions in the space 
cabin with respect to different parameters (oxygen, nitrogen, 
carbon dioxide, temperature and pressure). By default all of 
these subsystems are automatically maintained within their 
target range. However, different faults may occur occasionally, 
due to a malfunction in any subsystem (e.g. leaks or blocks of 
a valve or defective sensors). The primary task of the operator 
involves supervisory control of the subsystems including 
diagnosis and management of system faults. The latter task is 
supported by an automated aid supporting fault diagnosis and 
management (Automated Fault Identification and Recovery 
Agent, AFIRA). In case of a fault, usually a general master 
alarm occurs. The presence of a critical system state always 
has to be approved by means of a mouse-click on an alarm 
mode icon which confirms the operator’s being aware of the 
change of system state. Together with the alert, AFIRA 
displays both, a fault-diagnosis that is generated automatically, 
as well as a supposed sequence of actions for effective fault 
management which then has to be implemented manually by 
the operator. The proposed sequence of actions always 
includes hints for appropriate manual control of the defective 
subsystem until it works properly again, and for initiating the 
repair of the diagnosed fault. Manual control activities can be 
implemented by selecting a subsystem-specific control window 
from a control menu. In order to repair the fault, a maintenance 
menu has to be opened by a mouse-click and an appropriate 
repair order has to be selected and sent from this menu. The 
latter initiates a repair that is achieved after 60 seconds if the 
diagnosis has been correct. As soon as the fault has been 
repaired, AFIRA displays a success message. Yet, it remains 
part of the operator’s task to verify that all system parameters 
are back in their target range and, if so, to deactivate the alarm 
mode (mouse-click on the corresponding icon).  
However, in case of AFIRA failures, i.e. false diagnosis or 
missed system fault, manual fault diagnosis and management 
are required. In addition to the information provided by 
AFIRA, the operator has independent access to all relevant 
information about the state of the different subsystems that 
might be used to detect system faults independent of AFIRA or 
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to verify the fault diagnoses suggested by AFIRA. This 
includes information about tank-levels and gas-flow rates in 
different parts of the system, as well as a “history graph” 
displaying the time-course of different system parameters 
across the past four minutes. Yet, to get specific information 
displayed, the operator has to activate it by mouse-click on a 
specific field. The information then is shown for 10 seconds 
before it is switched off again until the participant recalls the 
information another time.  
Besides the primary task, two secondary tasks have to be 
accomplished. The first one includes a prospective memory 
task which requires the operator to record the level of a certain 
parameter at fixed intervals (every 60 seconds). The second 
task represents a simple reaction-time task which requires 
clicking as fast as possible on a connection symbol which 
appears unpredictably (on average once a minute). 
 
Procedure 
 
The study consisted of two 4-hour sessions conducted on 
two different days. The first session included practice of 
manual fault identification and management. The second 
session included the experiment. In the first part of this latter 
session, participants were familiarized and trained with 
AutoCAMS, i.e. learned how to use AFIRA for fault diagnosis 
and management. As part of this training all participants were 
explicitly informed that failures of AFIRA may occur and 
warned to cross-check the system. However, only half of the 
subjects (“experience group”) were exposed to such failures 
during training. Whereas the diagnoses provided by AFIRA 
always were correct, two automation misses occurred, i.e. two 
out of ten system faults remained undetected by AFIRA. To 
make sure that the participants really noticed both of these two 
failures, they were asked to record each occurring system fault. 
Based on these records the experimenter provided feedback on 
the participants’ fault detection performance after each training 
unit (three units, each lasting 20 minutes).  
For the other half of the participants (“information 
group”) AFIRA displayed and diagnosed all ten system faults 
correctly during practice. After this familiarization all 
participants had to work with AutoCAMS for 100 minutes. 
During this period a total of 14 system faults occurred. AFIRA 
detected and displayed the first nine of these faults as well as 
faults 11 and 12 correctly. However, AFIRA did not display 
faults 10 and 13 (automation misses) and provided a false 
diagnosis for fault 14. 
 
Dependent Measures 
 
Dependent measures were derived from log-file records of 
the mouse-clicks performed by the operators and the status of 
the different subsystems. 
Complacency towards the alarm function. Information 
sampling during phases which are indicated to be fault-free by 
the decision aid enables participants to evaluate the factual 
system state. Based on this reasoning, the number of 
information requests (mouse-clicks) per minute during the last 
120 seconds before the occurrence of a system fault was taken 
as an (inverse) indicator of complacency towards the alarm 
function of the decision aid.  
Omission error. All events where an automation miss 
occurred (faults 10 and 13) and participants did not activate 
the alarm mode before the system reached an extremely critical 
state, was counted as omission error. Critical system states 
were defined as “extreme” whenever a system parameter had 
exceeded the outer boundary of its target range. 
Complacency towards the diagnostic function. In order to 
derive a direct measure for complacency towards the 
diagnostic function it was recorded to what extent the 
participants attempted to verify the automatically generated 
fault diagnoses before they initiated a repair order. This was 
done by analyzing which, if any, parameters of the different 
subsystems were sampled by operators after activation of the 
alarm mode and contrasting this with a “normative model” 
(Moray, 2003; Moray & Inagaki, 2000) of information 
sampling, i.e. which parameters should be looked at in order to 
verify a certain diagnosis. Based on this rationale, an 
automation verification score was defined as the portion of all 
parameters relevant to verify a certain diagnosis that were 
actually sampled by the participant. Note that this measure is 
inversely related to complacency, varying from zero (no 
attempt of verification at all; i.e. extreme complacent 
behavior) to one (perfect verification; no complacency at all). 
Commission error. If a participant initiated the wrong 
repair order suggested by AFIRA for fault 14, a commission 
error was counted. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Complacency towards the Alarm Function 
 
Information sampling data for the fault-free phases 
preceding faults 1-3, 4-6 and 7-9 were pooled in order to 
reduce intra-subject variability and analyzed by a 2 (group 
assignment) x 3 (fault blocks) analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
with “fault-blocks” as within-subjects factor. Participants of 
the “experience group” sampled significantly more 
information (M = 19.06) than participants of the “information 
group” (M = 14.43), F(1, 21) = 4.37, p < .05, (see Figure 1). 
Neither a main effect of fault blocks nor an interaction effect 
was observed.  
 
Omission Error 
 
At fault 10, when AFIRA failed for the first time, 80 
percent of the information group, but only 18.2 percent of the 
experience group committed an omission error, p < .01 (one-
tailed Fisher’s exact test). At fault 13, this group difference 
was not visible anymore, as again 18.2 percent of the 
experience group, but this time only 22.2 percent of the 
information group did not detect the system fault (see Figure 
2). Comparison between participants who successfully 
detected the first automation miss and those who failed did not 
reveal any significant effect with respect to either kind of 
complacency. 
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Complacency towards the Diagnostic Function 
 
Again data analysis was based on the first 9 faults and a 2 
(group assignment) x 3 (fault blocks) ANOVA. No difference 
between groups was observed. Neither a main effect of fault 
blocks nor an interaction effect was observed. Participants 
sampled on average 60 percent of the parameters relevant to 
verify the suggested diagnoses (see Figure 3).  
 
Commission Error 
 
74 percent of the participants committed a commission 
error. These were distributed almost equally across the two 
experimental groups. Hence, no group effect emerged. 
Inspection of the verification behavior just before committing 
the error revealed that 80 percent of the participants followed 
the false recommendation because of varying levels of 
complacency towards the diagnostic function.  
  
Yet, 20 percent of the participants followed the 
recommendation despite seeking out all parameters necessary 
to prove the automated advice wrong. Participants who 
committed a commission error showed a higher degree of 
complacency towards the diagnostic function with respect to 
the first nine faults, where AFIRA has worked reliably. This 
was revealed by a 2 (commission error yes/no) x 3 (fault 
blocks) ANOVA. Participants who detected the false diagnosis 
by AFIRA sampled a considerably higher portion of relevant 
parameters (M = 0.89) than participants who missed the failure 
(M = 0.49), main effect “commission error” F(1, 21) = 15.01, 
p < .01 (see Figure 4). No other effect became significant. 
However, participants who committed a commission error did 
not differ from participants who detected the false diagnosis 
with regard to their level of complacency towards the aid’s 
alarm function. Furthermore, comparison regarding the 
number of omission errors did not reveal any difference 
between participants committing and avoiding commission 
errors.  
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 DISCUSSION 
 
Four conclusions can be drawn from the data presented 
above: Firstly, the results provide clear evidence for a specific 
effect of automation failures. As expected, the experience of 
automation misses reduced the level of complacency towards 
the alarm function of the decision aid. Furthermore, the 
number of omission errors at the first automation miss was 
reduced by more than 60 percent for the experience group 
compared to the information group. The fact that this group 
effect disappeared when the second automation miss occurred, 
demonstrates once more the direct effect of automation 
failures. However, complacency towards the aid’s diagnostic 
function and commission errors were not affected by the 
experimental manipulation. Similarly, Manzey et al. (2006) 
showed that false diagnoses during training reduce 
complacency towards the diagnostic function of a decision aid 
but not towards the aid’s alarm function. Apparently, the 
impaired reliability of one system function does not call into 
question the reliability of the system as a whole. This implies 
that operators are very well capable of differentiating between 
function components with varying degrees of reliability, i.e. to 
exhibit what has been referred to as “high functional specifity” 
(Lee & See, 2004). Such a high functional specifity represents 
a precondition of an appropriate level of trust and accordingly 
a desirable effect.  
Secondly, results suggest that commission and omission 
errors represent independent phenomena. This is revealed by 
the differential effects of automation misses and false 
diagnosis on the two different aspects of complacency and 
automation bias, as described above. Furthermore, committing 
one of the two error types was not associated with a higher risk 
of committing the other error type in question. In line with this 
effect, no link between complacency towards the diagnostic 
function and the alarm function of the decision aid was 
observed. 
The third conclusion is that commission errors appear to 
be clearly linked to a high level of complacency towards the 
diagnostic function of a decision aid, as participants who 
committed a commission error showed a significantly higher 
level of complacency in previous trials. This effect is in line 
with results of Manzey et al. (2006) and provides further 
evidence for the assumption that complacency is one possible 
cause of commission errors. However, according to Mosier et 
al. (2001) commission errors might occur either because of 
some kind of complacency or because of a decision making 
problem, i.e. despite all relevant information necessary to 
falsify the recommendation of an automated system was 
sampled before. Exploratory data inspection reveals evidence 
for both kinds of commission errors. The majority (80 percent) 
of the participants committed a commission error due to some 
degree of complacency. Yet, about 20 percent followed the 
recommendation despite seeking out all information to prove 
the automated advice wrong.  
The fourth conclusion is a practical one: Training 
programs which aim at a reduction of automation misuse 
should take the specific effect of automation failures into 
account. The present study shows that the experience of 
automation failures during training represents an effective 
countermeasure to reduce automation misuse. Yet, the 
inhibiting effect remained failure specific. Hence, trainings 
which aim at a comprehensive prevention of over trust related 
effects should involve each automated function and the 
corresponding potential automation failures. 
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